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Abstract
This paper reports on findings from an ongoing
study of recent software applications that attempt to
turn mobile ICT’s into political tools. The software in
question endeavors to make new types of political
behavior expressible for ICT users. Two troubling
trends
were
found.
The
first
involves
incommensurability between backend databases and
the data traces generated by users. The second
involves the production of data and metadata
vulnerabilities. As part of discussing these trends, the
authors introduce the idea of “minor apps” and
argue for their importance within discussions of
sociotechnical aspects of digital infrastructure.

1. Introduction
This paper shares findings from a recent study of
software applications that were principally designed
for use on mobile ICTs: information and
communication technologies scaled for portability,
such as smartphones and tablets that run mobile
operating systems like Android, BlackBerry OS, iOS,
Nokia X or Tizen. Mobile ICTs support factoryinstalled or user-downloaded “apps” (i.e., software
applications) that leverage the device’s size, location,
hardware functions (e.g., camera, audio, memory),
and commercial wireless networks to enable new
forms of human communication, public sociality,
engagement with space and place, and new forms of
being in the world (immersed, augmented). Such
devices and the software that runs on them, as we
highlight in this paper, have also begun to enable new
forms of political behavior that have little
resemblance to the famous cases of Occupy Wall
Street and Arab Spring [7], which played such a key
role in demonstrating the political potential of ICTs
but as historical events are increasingly distant from
the digital and data infrastructures of our current
moment.
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Mobile ICTs are spreading (i.e., achieving
technological saturation) and diversifying at a rate
previously unwitnessed in human history. No other
documented technology of which we know has
moved so quickly into so many hands and cultures,
but also taken such a variety of slightly different
forms and capabilities while doing so. By the end of
2015, there were reported to be over 7 billion mobile
cellular subscriptions in the world. In addition, the
International Telecommunications Union estimates
that there will be approximately 6.1 billion
smartphones in the world by 2020, which is also
when we expect to see 5th generation (5G) mobile
networks in place, whose creators are promising
faster data transmission rates, increased coverage,
and more [11].
How mobile subscriptions are counted is a topic
of ongoing controversy because what actually gets
counted in such reports are SIM connections and not
unique human subscribers. Similarly, what counts as
a smartphone is not typically well-defined in
estimates of smartphones. Nonetheless, it has become
incontrovertible that mobile ICTs and their “apps”
are now a key part of our digital and data
infrastructures, not only here in Hawaii but also
globally [11]. The published numbers, although not
wholly accurate, are themselves further proof: how
mobile ICTs are not yet countable in precise and
sophisticated ways is a testament to the pace of their
creation, spread, and permutation.
Because of these developments, studies of mobile
ICTs and the software created for them can follow a
number of different research paths. Our research
concentrates on recent efforts to develop apps that
allow people to express their political views in new
ways or that allow people to engage in political
struggle in ways that were not previously doable,
perhaps even as recently as 2010 or 2012. We study
efforts to turn current-generation mobile devices into
political tools, and we try to keep our attention
focused on the very latest happenings in this domain.
In doing so, we track new mobile hardware and
software as it gets developed and released, study the
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social impact of mobile technologies, and study the
ways in which existing patterns of human culture and
behavior inform the creation and use of mobile ICTs.
Within this broader research agenda, we maintain a
particular focus on new and emerging enactments of
political behavior that directly involve the
operationalization
of
mobile
devices
like
smartphones and tablets.
All mobile devices are “political tools” to some
degree, one could argue. For example, such devices
are typically bound up with controversial processes
of natural resource extraction (mining for coltan,
copper, iron, nickel, tungsten, etc.); imbricated within
global supply chains that mobilize alienated labor;
and popularly understood only through the veneer of
advertising strategies that are created by experts in
fields like consumer behavior and marketing
psychology [3] to purposefully shape public beliefs
and sentiments [6]. Such devices are also bound up
with sexed, gendered and racialized cultures of
hardware and software engineering that continue to
be male-dominated and majority-white, at least in the
United States, which is where we focus the bulk of
our research attention.
Each of these topics warrants careful study and
further attention. But our research specifically
focuses on how mobile devices allow users to create
new political possibilities for themselves in real time:
different ways of being in the world, different ways
of being socially situated, and different ways of
engaging with uneven distributions of resources, risk,
opportunity, and power. Our larger goal is to
understand how digital platforms and infrastructures
are sites of political interaction today, starting with
the idea that such interactions have the potential to
change quickly given the current rate of technological
saturation and diversification in the domain of mobile
ICTs.
This research on mobile ICTs and our
mobilization of the term political tools builds directly
on the sizable (and still-growing) body of academic
literature that explores the fascinating and multilayered links between everyday political culture and
digital media [4, 13, 18]. Our work also draws
inspiration from the growing body of research that
looks at the use of mobile ICTs within social
movements [9, 10, 16]. These bodies of scholarship
have accomplished several things that continue to be
foundational to our own work: justifying mobile
ICT’s as a valid object of academic study;
establishing that digital and data infrastructures are
increasingly entangled with political cultures; and
making discussable the links between hardware,
software, information systems, information services,
and quotidian political behavior.

Our research adds to this exciting body of work
by shifting some of the empirical attention to “minor”
apps that lack large developer teams, large user
communities, high levels of financing, and/or
discernible plans for maintenance and sustainability.
Much of the published research, at least so far,
focuses on engagements with ICTs that mobilize
large user communities (e.g., Twitter or Instagram)
and rely upon a high path dependency on cloud
computing and networked platforms for web-based
databases and storage (for example, Gmail or
Facebook). In these cases, the apps in question
typically force the users to access data on a webbased client instead of access data on their internal
storage, and further, such apps typically encourage
users to let the software continuously run in the
background of their mobile devices and passively
collect new data such as recent pictures or one’s
current location. Such major apps facilitate a
captivating range of political behaviors and will
almost certainly continue to do so.
We wondered, though, about the thousands of
apps that are developed and published or sold that
don’t aim to have millions of downloads but are only
intended for tens or hundreds of downloads at best. In
fact, most apps arguably fit on a matrix of at least
two axes (see Figure 1.), where one axis moves from
mainstream to niche user communities. The other
axis concerns where data is collected and stored (i.e.,
what is done with data). In our research, we have
begun to explore apps that aim to support or service
niche user communities and on apps that encourage
users to leverage the internal storage on their devices.

Figure 1. Matrix of users and data storage
As we’re discovering in our work, which is ongoing
and exploratory, and as we discuss in further detail
below, much of the software in this other quadrant
(what we call “minor apps”) seems to work as little
more than a rudimentary pairing of databases and
data traces: the software lacks much of the
functionality and ‘app-iness’ that current generation
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ICT users would normatively expect with regard to
features, look, and feel (user interface). However, we
argue that some provocative developments are
nonetheless occurring when it comes to people’s
political behavior and when it comes to the idea of
using mobile devices as political tools.

2. Method and Design
The paper unfolds in the following manner: we
begin by further elaborating on the idea of minor
apps and argue for their importance as objects of
study for those interested in the “complicated
relationship” [14] that people have with mobile ICTs.
We then detail some of our latest research findings,
focusing on 6 of the apps that we’ve been
investigating among a larger body (N=18). All 6 are
English-language examples from the United States,
an acknowledged limitation of our work. Another
limitation: we chose to limit our discussion here to
mobile apps that are available free of cost and
developed for Android and iOS, two of the most
popular and accessible mobile operating systems for
users of smartphones and for developers designing
and publishing apps [15]. Following the section on
minor apps, we focus on some of the glitches and
limitations that we’ve been discovering by analyzing
the data traces generated by minor apps, how the
apps utilize databases, and issues of metadata
creation. We conclude the paper with a discussion of
why this research matters to those concerned with the
sociotechnical aspects of digital infrastructure and
sketch some directions of future research.
The apps that we discuss in this paper include the
following: Flyrights, an app geared toward the Sikh
community that promises to document and map
incidents of discrimination or profiling at airport
checkpoints managed by the U.S. Transportation
Security Administration (TSA); Testee, an app
primarily geared toward “millennials” that allows
users to share STD/STI test results in a Snapchat-like
fashion, with a promise to immediately delete the
records, as a way to promote sexual frankness and to
disrupt cultural legacies of shaming around sex
(many of which are heteronormative legacies, in
addition to being anti-sex); RedLightTraffic, an app
that allows users to report suspected incidents of
human trafficking that works like a citizen law
enforcement tool for curbing sexual slavery and
contemporary articulations of sexualized slave labor;
Hinder, a Tinder parody app that promises to expose
anti-abortion and “anti-women” politicians and
government officials; and We-Consent, an app that
allows users to create a video record of one’s

affirmative consent to sexual activity, just before
having sex, as a way to push back on and challenge
American rape cultures. Each of the 6 apps discussed
in this paper is a minor app with limited functionality
and a relatively small user community.
Much of our research and discussion is grounded
in data trace analysis. This kind of data trace analysis
represents a methodological innovation for
information and communication scholars grappling
with the rapid updates and near-constant terms of
service (ToS) changes found in contemporary mobile
ICTs and networked platforms. Much of our research
and discussion also builds on methodological and
empirical research trends circulated at HICSS
specifically, which as a scholarly community has
become one of the principal sites of methodological
innovation when it comes to critically investigating
digital and data infrastructures.

3. What is a minor app?
Apps are software applications that run on mobile
operating systems. Apps also leverage device
capabilities and access commercial wireless networks
that connect users to the internet. A number of apps
come pre-installed on current-generation mobile
devices, but most users download them from app
stores (e.g., Google Play Store and iTunes App
Store), which are online marketplaces that manage
and control app consumption patterns and planned
obsolescence patterns by way of developer guidelines
and managed distribution channels. It should also be
noted: the majority of apps developed for and
distributed through app stores are proprietary
software. While many are “free” to users, the source
code cannot usually be changed or modified by users.
In earlier work, we found that such patterns of
software production and consumption on the part of
app stores and mobile device and app developers
leads to routine software updates and, at times,
software update unrest on the part of software users
because developer control over apps and their
versioning can significantly reorganize and upend
software user experiences [2]. In other words: we had
already discovered that apps could be sites of politics
and political contestation, but we had not considered
the idea of major and minor apps.
Part of our delay in realizing the existence of such
apps (or the generativeness of such distinctions) is
that apps were not always a prominent aspect of
mobile ICTs. For example, first-generation mobile
phones on 2G networks, also known as “feature
phones,” had only a few functions, such as an address
book, calendar, and text message client. As mobile
broadband internet coverage increased with 3G

2327

networks, smartphones that connect to the internet
have increased in production and popularity.
Consequently, the app market has grown to represent
a new and interesting distribution model for software.
Instead of using a traditional file structure (tree-style
directory format) to access individual files (like .jpeg
and .mp3), contemporary smartphone operating
systems rely heavily on downloaded and updateable
apps that allow users to create and access networked
databases, typically via cloud infrastructures. As
compared to feature phones, many of the most
popular and widely-used smartphone apps today are
largely designed to transmit data (i.e., push data out
or pull data down) and not necessarily to create or
store data internally on the mobile device. Yet this
change over time is marked by internal diversity:
fundamental differences are emerging between apps
and not all “new” apps are necessarily making use of
current-generation digital and data infrastructures.
In their groundbreaking research on cultures of
software development, Christopher Kelty and Seth
Erickson argue: “Software is neither material nor
immaterial but durable, entrenched and scaffolded”
[12]. For Kelty and Erikson, moreover, the study of
software is also the study of people: the existence of
software “implies an ecology of users, designers,
maintainers, as well as organizations and physical
facilities that must be kept running and made
durable”. One way, then, of approaching the
“software app” as an object of study is to think about
how users of mobile ICTs are always situated within
a complex social milieu that operates in the
“background” of any mobile device, often invisible to
users yet nonetheless co-shaping what is thinkable
and doable with mobile devices. One must also keep
in mind the various mobile operating systems,
competing app markets, and the billions of active
mobile devices now connected to wireless networks
which together create a polyphonic range of software
apps and app experiences that mark slightly different
technological moments (e.g., 2011, 2014, 2017),
depending on the creation date and update history,
and possess different levels of vitality (or
“durability”).
In shifting our research attention to minor apps,
we were initially uncertain as to how such apps might
differ from or reinforce the patterns of software
production and use documented by other researchers,
such as Kelty and Erickson. We were also uncertain
as to the criteria for calling an app minor. But several
things became apparent as we began to explore this
other quadrant of app development and use, and as
we began to group minor apps together into what we
argue is a coherent object of study, much like the
“minor literature” analyzed by Gilles Deleuze and

Félix Guattari [8]. Our working definition of minor
apps, which we enthusiastically invite others to
trouble or revise, is that such apps are politically
unambiguous; uniquely particular in their intended
audience; developed by or for those who hold
marginalized positions in society; cannot as
applications fully capitalize on current hardware and
software capabilities; and cannot as applications fully
capitalize on current digital and data infrastructures.
Minor apps are inelegant but radical in potential.
They don’t always work as described or intended but
they mark a fundamental shift in the longer history of
how ICTs and political culture interoperate,
something dramatically different from what other
researchers found in the cases of Occupy Wall Street
or Arab Spring, to offer two better known examples
of ICTs intermixing with political behavior.

4. Findings: Some trends in minor apps
One of the major trends that we’re observing
during our research is something that we began
calling “glitchbait.” Glitchbait apps oversell what
they promise to do for users. After one or two uses,
glitchbait apps become meaningless because they
don’t offer users updated or tailored information to
their needs (“junkware” is a similar term used by
others). The mismatch between most of these bait and
glitch apps has to do with an incommensurability
between the data traces that the user would create
(presumably submit to the developers), and the time
or space limits of the databases that the app queries to
match the desired function.
For example, with Hinder, the profiles of antiabortion and “anti-women” politicians and
government officials are served up in a user’s
matching stream, like its reference point, Tinder, the
popular dating app. The profiles served up to the
user are based on a user’s location. Users in, say,
Santa Barbara would initially receive profile matches
that detail the ideologies or viewpoints of California
state representatives. But once a user has swiped
through a small number of “anti-women” (a term
never fully pinned down or defined) politicians and
political leaders, California in this scenario, the app
begins to feed profiles from nearby states without
notification or without the ability to return to
California profiles. The user has to swipe through a
whole database of anti-abortion and “anti-women”
politicians in the US before getting back to
California. Admittedly, reality is always more
complex than any database structure can depict [5],
but the user’s GPS location information doesn’t
scope out or limit the stream of possibilities based on
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location limits for which the app claims to be
purpose-built, as one would find in other swiping
apps, such as the more well-known apps Tinder and
Hinge. In the mobile dating apps that Hinder is based
on (and parodying), setting location limits and
targeted radiuses are major design features [17].
Because users can, by law, only vote in the state of
their residence, how the Hinder app fumbles with
location services, and the physical worldliness of
mobile ICT’s, means that it starts flooding users with
potentially irrelevant data.
FlyRights is another glitchbait app. The app isn’t
dynamic or reflective of user uploads in real time, nor
does it appear that the developers are regularly
submitting incidents of airport profiling. In this case,
instead of a frontend glitch with accessing the right
data or database, the app has a backend glitch with
the systems reporting database, which doesn’t update
frequently to absorb trace data from users based on
their new (and ongoing) racial profiling encounters at
TSA checkpoints. In the case of FlyRights, the
database of incident reports is perpetually outdated
and misrepresents the rate and severity of airport
profiling, the very problem the app aims to empower
users to help chronicle and combat.
In both of these cases, the developers seem to be
struggling to resolve how to achieve each app’s
central promise. Ineffectively folding in new data
traces makes each app produce biased or flawed
results. In each of these cases the “bait” is an app that
works with up-to-date trace data submitted by users,
the glitch is that these apps don’t succeed because the
database is populated with outdated data or with poor
limits on the data being accessed.
A second trend that we’re observing in our
research is evidence that minor apps are creating data
and metadata traces that have afterlives or secondary
use applications that may be unknown to users or
perhaps even to the app developers themselves.
Certain data traces may serve as “metadata” in one
context because they provide information about
people’s activity or behaviors, but they may also
serve as “data” if they are themselves analyzed in
other contexts and used as evidence to make a claim
or argument [1]. For example, the user-generated
content submitted through RedlightTraffic, Testee,
and We-Consent produce location data that would
have been previously difficult to collect. While each
app’s intended purpose is to create data for storage
and secure transmission privately, the app delivery
receipts also appear in download caches of the
devices themselves, even after they have been
deleted. In each of these apps, device features are
harnessed to produce technical information about the
time, place, and size of any data transmission. These

technical data are background to the user, but are
essential to the functioning of each app.
Often when we download and share our data with
mobile apps, we “dubiously consent” (sometimes
called “dubcon” in other contexts) to create metadata
that will have unknown consequences in the future,
perhaps even for which the developers themselves
cannot speculate. Downloading the app from the
Google Play Store or Apple’s iTunes App store
creates a record of transaction on the marketplaces as
well as on the storage directory of the device’s
operating system. Once users download and begin to
use each of these apps, there remains a history of
transmission and timestamp. Dubcon apps such as
these create metadata with strange afterlives: users
give consent to create and transmit data, but it
remains unclear whether they would consent to the
powerful metadata created as part of the process if
future use cases of metadata could be known. Just as
the appearance of a colleague's email address in the
recent Ashley Madison data dump points to particular
kinds of use, the existence of Redlight Traffic,
Testee, and We-Consent on your download cache
points to speculative use cases of the intent and
outcome of making use of these apps. Despite their
up-front (seemingly clear) and functional origins,
aggregated metadata or metadata taken out of context
can play different roles for different stakeholders
within digital and data infrastructures. These
metadata can become more powerful evidence than
the content initially created by the user, and in these
particular cases can be used to track political activity
and behavior.

5. Discussion and Conclusion
The mobile apps that we’ve been examining in
our research represent some of the edges of digital
culture and app development. They have niche user
communities and limited functionality. But each
seems purpose-built for engaging in expressly
political behavior. Each tries to make new kinds of
political behavior afforded, to use the language of
affordances. Developed for mobile ICTs, the apps try
to immerse technology into a user’s political life in
new ways, or to augment a user’s engagement with
and relationship to pre-existing (and often
longstanding, embodied) political struggles around
physical and cultural differences, and around the
uneven distribution of resources, risk, opportunity,
and power in society. The user may not have any
prior relationships with or fluencies in these specific
political struggles, nor the app developers. That
makes the apps that we’ve been studying all the more
fascinating: the links between what we’re calling
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minor apps and more famous examples of political
behavior
involving
digital
platforms
and
infrastructures are not immediately clear. In many
ways, we hope that’s one of the central contributions
of this paper: shifting the empirical attention and
calling attention to minor apps as political grounds.
Two major trends that we’ve been observing in
our research, which focuses on the United States, are
the following: (1) a common disconnection between
the data traces and databases underpinning minor app
functionality and (2) the active production of data
vulnerabilities due to how minor apps create and
store data and metadata traces. As our research
continues, we intend to look for these trends across a
greater range of minor apps, which this paper posits
is a useful term or category of analysis for critically
talking about sociotechnical aspects of digital
infrastructure, the focus of our discussion here as we
elaborate on why this research matters and articulate
some directions for future research.
Our research presented here begins to shed light
on several sociotechnical aspects of the worlds
underpinning minor app development and
surrounding minor application use. One possibility is
that an alternate way of making digital and data
infrastructure is starting to root into commercial app
stores and, moreover, doing so despite breaking from
the normative conventions that mainstream users
might associate with “good” design practice or app
development. If that’s the case, minor apps of this
type could represent a purpose-built materialization
of political values, a tangible example of “appiness”
denied on the part of app designers and developers
who want to create some other form of user
experience and engagement because they hold an
alternate perspective on either digital platforms,
infrastructures, or both.
A second possibility is that what we’re currently
reading as troubling trends are in fact manifestations
of tension between commercial wireless providers
and minor app developers, between mobile hardware
makers and minor app developers, or some
combination thereof (depending on the app in
question, the nature of the glitches or vulnerabilities,
and the particular actor groups involved). Informed
by the research presented here and by ongoing
discussions at HICSS, we remain open in our
research to the possibility that what we’re beginning
to discover is actually a broader set of tensions that
potentially involve not only a thick social layer but
also the thick physical layer that comprises
commercial “wireless” networks and “wireless”
communications.
A third possibility is that fundamental skill and
knowledge gaps exist among those trying to turn

mobile devices into political tools. Who gets to
participate in politically experimenting with ICTs,
and what they know and can do as app designers and
developers, is almost certainly shaped by pre-existing
patterns of privilege and opportunity. These examples
may be cases of limits and limiting factors: “the best
that can be done” by these particular developer
communities.
As we continue to carry out work on what we
think is an important and understudied topic, what we
expect to find on the near horizon is not just one or
two mega-platforms for political behavior but a
planet populated by a litany of minor apps, for all
different types of users and political contexts, and for
all different types of mobile devices. In their current
instantiation, such tools try to do things like give
people the situational capacity to add to running,
open-ended data resources designed for public use or
push data about specific political causes or allow
people to create new kinds of records as a way of
being politically engaged or allow people to find
politically-charged resources or services. But such
tools have a level of particularity to them that
frequent users of major apps would likely find
unusual, along with a high level of “disfunctionality”
for lack of a more appropriate term.
Directions for future research include a broader
investigation of “appiness” and its denial in existing
app marketplaces, studies of practice that attend to
tensions between the actor groups involved in the
design, production and use of minor apps as well as
explore if and how such tensions find materialization,
and investigations of skill and knowledge inequities
within app developer communities that may be
limiting what’s thinkable and doable with mobile
ICTs among those working at the very edges of
technology-assisted political behavior.
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